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Pregledni znanstveni rad 
ILLEGAL STATE AID IN TAXATION AND POSSIBLE 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CROATIAN TAX 
ADMINISTRATION1
This article presents recent EU investigations on transfer pricing arrangements in 
corporate taxation of some multinational corporations. These investigations examine 
whether decisions by tax authorities in Ireland, The Netherlands and Luxembourg 
(regarding Apple, Starbucks and Fiat Finance and Trade, respectively) comply with EU 
rules on state aid. Encouraged by the efforts of the OECD and public criticism on the 
unfair allocation of the tax burden among multinational corporations and smaller, 
domestic businesses and ordinary people, the EU Commission has taken many measures in 
the last two years to make corporate taxes fairer across Europe. This article discusses the 
impact of current international efforts to re-arrange the global tax system on the Croatian 
Tax Administration which is trying to keep on the track of harmonisation with EU tax 
legislation, best practice and a partner-like relationship with taxpayers.  
Key words: fiscal state aid; EU investigations; Croatian Tax 
Administration. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Tax principles were developed at a time when economies were relatively 
closed and predominantly concerned with the domestic activities of 
individuals and enterprises. An international tax regime has been built 
around a network of bilateral tax treaties, the majority of which were 
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structured upon the OECD Model2. Today, the international tax community 
(represented by the OECD, the G20 and the EU3) have recognised the need 
to harmonize tax systems and make them more transparent, with the final 
goal to tackle tax evasion at a global level. 
According to the Commission, corporate taxation in the EU needs to be 
fundamentally reformed as the current corporate taxation rules within the 
EU no longer fit contemporary market realities4. 
The OECD and the EU, with the substantial monitoring of media, emphasise 
that the tax burden of the economic crisis is unjustly borne by smaller 
domestic enterprises and citizens, while multinational corporations use its 
opportunities to engage in tax avoidance. Such a generalisation and 
simplification of reality can hardly be explained by the risks and complexity 
of the environment that multinationals are confronted with.  
Multinationals are facing a variety of financial markets, currency risks, costs 
and standards (of production models, environmental protection, accounting), 
tax and foreign exchange systems, as well as trade, cultural and sociological 
obstacles. All these different aspects of business are the result of different 
factors that affect them, due to the exposure of a group of companies in 
international markets. Differences in tax systems can result in double 
taxation and double non-taxation for multinational corporations (in spite of 
the general opinion that multinationals are constantly avoiding double 
taxation by taking every opportunity for double non-taxation). Actually, 
multinational corporations suffer from tax costs caused by disparities in 
international taxation unknown to small and medium enterprises nor to the 
majority of citizens. These costs include, for example, non-creditable 
withholding taxes, non-deductible items, transfer pricing disputes, unused 
losses and multiplied tax compliance costs5. For example, with increased 
internationalisation, “(M)ultinationals have been forced to hire an army of 
2 The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. The first OECD Model 
dates back to the time of the League of Nations, which initiated working on double taxation 
in 1920 and which eventually, in 1928, resulted in a first draft (Bogovac, 2014). 
3 Nearly 90 countries, members of the OECD, G20 and developing countries, are working 
together on the development of a multilateral instrument capable of incorporating the tax 
treaty-related BEPS (Base erosion and profit shifting) measures into the existing network of 
bilateral treaties (OECD 2013). 
4 EU 2015c, 11. 
5 Bogovac 2014, 12. 
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tax lawyers, accountants, and economists to defend the particular transfer 
prices they use”6. Today, 20 years after these words were written, 
multinational corporations are even more under pressure to protect 
themselves from ongoing public criticism and the scrutiny of the OECD and 
the EU regarding transfer pricing arrangements. 
Simultaneously, during the last 20 years, in the course of the 
implementation of the modern tax system within the newly established 
market economy in Croatia, the tax administration has been on the path of 
harmonisation with the best practices of the EU in the area of legislation, 
efficiency and institutional reputation. Substantial efforts have been put into 
building a better relationship and better communication with taxpayers. The 
tax system has been used in order to make some activities or regions 
attractive for investors and to promote economic growth. All these activities 
were done to create a positive tax environment for business and thus 
motivate foreign direct investment. 
With the aim of explaining all relevant aspects of the issue, in Part 2 of this 
essay the Croatian Tax Administration is presented. Part 3 offers 
explanations on EU investigations and several issues closely connected with 
them, namely the raising of public opinion and international efforts to 
combat global tax avoidance, the dynamic environment and profit-oriented 
management of MNEs, together with the rationales of transfer pricing 
regimes and the basics of fiscal state legislation. Part 4 predicts some 
possible consequences of the behaviour and practice of the Croatian Tax 
Administration and offers a conclusion to the issue. 
2. TAX ADMINISTRATION IN CROATIA
The Croatian Tax Administration (hereinafter CTA) is the administrative 
organization within the Ministry of Finance whose basic task is to prepare, 
draft and implement regulations concerning the payment of taxes and 
obligatory contributions. The main duties of the CTA include: (i) normative 
activities; (ii) a proactive role in tax policy - to suggest changes in tax policy 
in order to improve the tax system and to collect, more efficiently, taxes and 
compulsory insurance contributions; (iii) numerous administrative and other 
6 Tanzi 1995, 139. 
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professional tasks within the process of the implementation of tax 
regulations and compulsory insurance contributions, including audits and 
simultaneous audits with representatives of competent authorities from 
Member States; (iv) international cooperation and administrative assistance 
with Member States and international organizations in the field of taxation; 
(v) the development and maintenance of a taxpayers service system to 
facilitate the fulfillment of the rights and obligations of taxpayers; (vi) tasks 
related to recording, determining, monitoring, collecting and enforcing the 
collection of taxes which belong entirely to the local and regional 
government and other public levies stipulated by law; and (vii) the 
collection and distraint of state budget revenues determined by the 
organizational units of the Ministry of Finance, upon the request of other 
Member States, and Croatian administration bodies and courts in 
accordance with special laws.7  
Within the scope of normative activities, the CTA provides official opinions 
and interpretations in individual cases on the implementation of regulations. 
As of the 25 July 2015, in accordance with the General Tax Act and By-law 
on binding opinions, tax return correction, statistical reports and tax 
settlements,8 a binding opinion may be issued on the following tax issues: 
(i) identification of taxable supplies for the purpose of pro-rata VAT 
calculation; (ii) application of the tax regulations on investment projects in 
Croatia whose value exceeds HRK 20,000,000 (approx. 2.6m EUR); (iii) tax 
base assessments in business combinations (excluding those in accordance 
with the relevant EU directives; and (iv) the application of double taxation 
treaties to the assessment of corporate and personal income tax liabilities. 
Additionally, a binding opinion may be issued on a tax issue with regards to 
business activities that are, due to their specific particularities, not typical in 
the Croatian business environment. The binding opinion is subject to a fee. 
The fee must be paid by the applicant before the submission of the 
application and its structure depends on the revenue the applicant has 
7 As prescribed by the Decree on internal organization of the Ministry of Finance the CTA 
performs multifold duties listed separately, as well as other duties stipulated by the Tax 
Administration Act. For the purpose of simplification and a general view of the roles and 
responsibilities of the CTA, they are all arranged here in seven groups of tasks. 
8 Art. 9.a of the General Tax Act and Art. 1. – 13. of the Bylaw on binding opinions, tax 
return correction, statistical reports and tax settlements. 
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declared in its tax return (max. HRK 30,000 or approx. 4,000 EUR). The 
CTA is obliged to issue the opinion within 60 days of the application date, 
however the deadline may be extended by 30 days in particularly complex 
cases. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the CTA has not issued any 
binding opinions until now, but some are under preparation. 
Tax administration in Croatia, like in other countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe, does not have long a history, tradition or experience in a 
market economy or the globalized world. Moreover, at the very beginning 
of its establishment, the CTA suffered from substantial pressure to collect 
public revenue during the Homeland War (1991-1995). After a long and 
scrutinized screening and audit of the harmonization of the tax legislation 
with the acquis communautaire, on 1st July 2013 Croatia became the 28th 
member of the European Union. While the other EU countries already felt 
the benefits of the recoveries of their economies, Croatia has been facing a 
period of austerity, with the CTA being under even more pressure to 
maintain public finance. If we bear in mind the dual (and self-contradictory) 
responsibility of tax administration, i.e. to collect public revenues in 
accordance with the budget and to promote the investment climate in the 
country by supporting it with different tax incentives that will decrease tax 
payments in the short-run, it goes without saying that the latter is of less 
importance for the CTA.. 
Frequent changes of tax legislation and the organisation of the CTA during 
the last two decades, repeatedly caused by political changes in Government, 
together with a weakly equipped tax administration, have created additional 
tensions between taxpayers and the tax administration.  
During the process of accession to the EU, the Commission's progress 
reports in the area of taxation (Chapter 16)9 were not very optimistic about 
the improvements in the Croatian tax system, but the most important issue 
that needed to be resolved remained administrative capacity.10 This is the 
rational conclusion, because although the overall structure of the tax 
legislation was similar to the acquis, the alignment of Croatian tax 
                                                 
9 Since March 2002, the Commission has reported regularly to the Council and the 
Parliament on progress made by the countries of the Western Balkans region. 
10 Even in the years with better reviews, for example for 2010, when the Commission found 
that “Croatia made good progress“ in some area of taxation, administrative capacity 
remains emphasized as improvable (cf: EU 2007, 40-41; EU 2010, 41). 
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legislation persists in being “far from complete“ and “further alignment is 
required“.11 
Legal tax certainty was substantially improved with the General Tax Act 
enacted in 2000. However, the non-uniform and authoritarian practices of 
the tax administration needed to change from the traditional old-fashioned 
relationship with the taxpayers to a modern, proactive partnership-like 
cooperation based on trust. The experience of the tax administrations of 
Member States was used as a guideline for the implementation of principles 
laid down in the law. The general goal of the CTA‘s external 
communication has become “(T)o build the reputation of the CTA as a 
successful institution of Croatia’s public sector based on good 
communication with the taxpayers”12. This goal should be reached by 
improvements in communication services, transparency in communication, 
training and knowledge-sharing. Changing the course of work from the 
single control and collection of taxes to more sophisticated ways of 
fulfilling its roles and responsibilities (in, basically, reaching the same 
goals) implies a change from the routine type of organisation technology13 
to an organisation that provides extraordinary public services. In the 
constantly and fast changing business environment, it is crucial to 
understand taxpayers14 and vice versa, hence communication and good faith 
is key. 
The CTA issued a Charter of cooperation with taxpayers in June 2014, 
aiming to improve understanding of the rights and obligation of taxpayers.15 
The simple, transparent and concise wording and structure of the Charter, 
together with the limited number of pages (nine pages in total), clearly 
11 Ibidem 
12 CTA 2012, 5. 
13 Koprić 1999, 416. 
14 For example, the tax administration officials can found themselves in the unenviable 
position of providing interpretations, omitting or failing to prevent transactions that exceed 
their capabilities. Tax administrations do not have much knowledge of the business 
conditions under which taxpayers make business decisions on a daily basis, specific to each 
industry and by the undertaking. Also, officials have no support in its organizational unit as 
employees working on joint projects at entrepreneurs have it. Therefore, the tax inspectors 
often are in the unenviable position where it is easier to reach for the "safer" choice, that is 
to decide at the expense of the taxpayer (Bogovac 2014, 99-100). 
15 CTA 2014. 
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explain what taxpayers can expect from the CTA and what the CTA expects 
from them.  
In addition to other instruments that are embedded in the General Tax Act 
(supra mentioned binding opinion and tax settlement), the issuance of The 
Communication Strategy16 and Charter (2014), The Code of professional 
ethics of public servants in Tax Administration,17 Strategy of the Tax 
Administration18, as well as numerous workshops and the training of CTA 
employees, have been accomplished in the last 20 years. Even though all 
these efforts mean less, being only words on paper, if not supported with a 
change in the state of mind and a devotion to persist in the implementation 
of an enhanced relationship with taxpayers, they still form a solid basis for a 
new era in the relationship between the CTA and taxpayers in Croatia. 
3. EU INVESTIGATIONS OF FISCAL STATE AIDS
The OECD sets new international standards and creates the basis for an EU 
approach in tackling double non-taxation of multinational enterprises. With 
a view to improving the functioning of the internal market and protecting 
tax revenues, the European Union recognized aggressive tax planning as a 
global issue that needs to be solved along with the OECD and Member 
States. 
Fiscal state aid rules have been applied in the European Union for decades, 
but their application in the context of tax rulings is relatively new. Tax 
rulings have been issued by tax authorities as a response to taxpayer’s 
questions and create certainty for taxpayers and tax authorities. Though 
completely legal and desirable, they may involve state aid and be subject to 
scrutiny from the European Commission. In the last few years the 
Commission has tightened its control of fiscal state aid, by using the EU 
competition tools, in order to examine individual tax rulings issued by 
Member States to apply to some multinational corporations. These rulings 
were concluded as advance pricing agreements with taxpayers in order to 
determine transfer prices used by taxpayers in future transactions in the 
16 CTA 2012. 
17 CTA 2009. 
18 CTA 2011. 
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complex and unpredictable business environment. Transfer prices are the 
most complicated issue in the field of taxation, and also constitute a very 
useful instrument for tax avoidance by multinational companies, as well as 
for tax revenue for governments. Therefore it is unsurprising that the 
European Commission has started to establish a systematic approach to the 
problem of tax rulings within the available measures of state aid. 
3.1. Public opinion and international efforts 
Multinational corporations are often blamed for undermining social welfare. 
Awakened public attention that questions “good corporate citizens“ has 
resulted in movements towards the establishment of codes, guidelines, 
communications, notes and declarations in the international regulation 
arena. Substantial improvements regarding corporate governance and the tax 
responsibility of MNEs have been made in the last decade due to the 
escalated activities of media and politicians. 
Though public opinion can be defined (slightly ironically) as “opinions held 
by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed”19, many 
fiscal programmes and political initiatives have been announced with the 
aim of closing loopholes which allow large corporations to avoid paying the 
proper amount of taxes in the countries where they make their profits. 
Necessarily, these actions have been rationalized by the need for fairness in 
taxation. 
In the 1990s, the incoming American Democratic President, Bill Clinton, 
announced his “determination to step up control over taxation of foreign 
MNEs on the premise that foreign corporations do not pay their ‘fair share’ 
of taxes in the United States”20.21 
Following a proposal from a report issued in 1998 (Harmful Tax 
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue; OECD 1998, 9), the OECD has 
created a special forum named Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, whose 
work focuses on three areas: (i) harmful tax practices in Member Countries; 
(ii) tax havens; and (iii) involving non-OECD economies. The Forum has 
19 As defined by the American political scientist V.O. Key in 1961 (Britannica 2015).  
20 Wallace 2002, 898. 
21 Though the later Report by the Internal Revenue Service showed that “for the most part, 
foreign companies do pay their fair share of taxes”(Wallace 2002, 898). 
262
also issued a Model Tax Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax 
Matters. 
In 2004, the EU Commission adopted a Communication on Preventing and 
Combating Financial and Corporate Malpractice, which provides a strategy 
for coordinated action in financial services, company law, accounting, tax, 
supervision and enforcement areas, in order to reduce the risk of financial 
malpractice22. In the area of taxation, the Commission suggests more 
transparency and information exchange in corporation tax in order to enable 
tax systems to better deal with complex corporate structures. 
In April 2009, the Commission adopted a Communication identifying 
actions that EU Member States should take to promote "good governance" 
in the area of taxation (e.g. more transparency, exchange of information and 
fair tax competition). The Communication identifies how good governance 
could be improved within the EU. It also lists the tools that the EU and its 
Member States have at their disposal to ensure that good governance 
principles are applied at the international level. Finally, it calls on Member 
States to adopt an approach that is more coherent with good governance 
principles in their bilateral relations with third countries. 
Driven by a context of tight public budgets and financial crisis in the years 
following 2008, the OECD and the EU continued with efforts to combat tax 
avoidance by big business. Even though some developed countries 
conducted their own investigations in 2012 (namely USA23, France24 and 
UK25), substantial improvements were accomplished by EU investigations 
in the domain of fiscal state aid. 
Google is an example of a multinational company that has been exposed to 
public criticism and the scrutiny of tax administrations and committees in 
the UK and France, due to the minimized tax paid within the letter of the 
law. After public accusations claiming that Google used complicated legal 
structures to avoid tax obligations in the UK (Wintour and Arthur 2013), six 
years of Google's UK tax returns (2006-2011) were placed under review by 
22 EU 2004b. 
23 Senat investigations on Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard and Caterpillar (USA 2012; USA 
2012a). 
24 France investigated Apple, Google and Facebook Inc. (Fairless and Schechner 2014).  
25 The Parliament Committee on Public Accounts held a hearing with representatives from 
Amazon, Google and Starbucks (UK 2012b).  
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HMRC. This increased legal tax uncertainty for Google and other 
corporations. Interestingly enough, HMRC was also accused by the 
Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee of ineffectiveness in enforcing 
the tax laws and collecting tax “owing under both national and international 
tax systems”26. 
Maybe the reason why HMRC is “lenient with big business”27 can be linked 
to the collaboration of Google with the British Government regarding the 
new Google Campus in London. In addition to cooperation with academics 
and business, the British Government has also cut tax rates and introduced 
new tax incentives aiming to “create new jobs, new growth and new 
prosperity” in the UK, and “build a more competitive economy”.28 Though 
Google reported a low effective tax rate in the UK, it has to be taken into 
consideration that it clearly disclosed its minimized UK tax and explained 
that this had been effected in accordance with tax legislation. Confronted 
with a dynamic environment, especially in the global arena, investors and 
analysts expect management to earn profits and, at the same time, to play 
fairly, acting as a good corporate citizens. A similar dual responsibility for 
HMRC is also self-contradictory: “it had been a policy of successive 
Governments to make the UK an attractive place for business and for 
multinationals to see the UK as competitive”29 while pursuing all the tax 
due from multinationals in accordance with tax laws. 
Cooperation with the government, and active roles in the creation of a 
competitive economy in the UK, and paying taxes in accordance with the 
letter of law, did not bring public approval to Google (nor to the UK 
Government); rather it brought great risks of financial losses and legal tax 
uncertainty. Representatives from Google attended the hearing held by the 
UK Parliamentary Committee, pursuant to the Committee's intention to 
explore issues on artificial transactions which Google used to reduce their 
profits in the UK.30 Though the Committee was not convinced on the 
business rationales offered by Google, it expressed its gratitude for the 
26 UK 2012b, para 2. 
27 Ibidem. 
28 UK 2012a. 
29 UK 2012b, para 2. 
30 UK 2012b, para 10-11. 
264
provision of evidence, because this gave them an example of the practices of 
other multinationals. 
All this time, Google was under constant media pressure for paying less tax 
in the USA and the UK then the majority of local companies and citizens. 
Corporate reputation is a very important aspect of the business future, 
because the ethical behaviour of corporations is an “important issue to their 
customers”31. Thanks to public opinion, a newly enacted UK tax is 
popularly called the ‘Google tax’.32 While other countries also raised 
questions about Google’s tax avoidance schemes,33 and Ireland changed its 
tax legislation in order to close tax loopholes used by Google, 34 the 
company has become famous not only for its innovations but also for its tax 
affairs. 
Google’s representatives have been very collaborative with respect to 
participation at hearings, investigation and public debate. This shows that 
they were either (i) convinced of the certainty of the company’s tax planning 
schemes, due to the respect they showed to legislation, or (ii) aware of the 
importance of public opinion. Almost certainly, they were both: maybe, at 
the beginning, they were sure that they had arranged their tax affairs in the 
most reasonable and legally safe way, because they would not have used 
such tax planning techniques if they had been aware of the possibility of 
such a public response. Later, awareness of damage caused to its corporate 
reputation prevailed, so the possible penalties for the previously used 
techniques were overridden by the possible financial losses that might be 
caused by the loss of trust of their customers. It seems that neither Google’s 
management nor its tax advisors where alerted to the change in the global 
tax playing field. 
31 UK 2012c, para 12. 
32 Diverted Profits Tax, introduced in Finance Act 2015, applicable from April 2015. Tax is 
implemented to UK legislation in aim to counter the use of aggressive tax planning 
techniques used by multinational enterprises to divert profits from the UK”. The standard 
rate of DPT is 25% of the diverted profit plus any ‘true-up interest’ (UK Government 
2014). 
33 For example in Italy, see: D'Alessandro and Masoni (2015). 
34 Stamp 2014. 
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As Google chairman Eric Schmidt told political leaders: “if there was a 
distinction between the letter and the spirit of the law, companies expect 
politicians to define the difference”.35 
Still, it is understandable that “there is genuine public anger and frustration” 
due to a notion that “rigorous action is taken against ordinary people and 
small businesses” in contrast to the benevolent approach to large, especially 
foreign-based corporations.36 
The OECD has continued its work on the integrity and fairness of tax 
systems. In July 2013 it published its Action Plan on base erosion and profit 
shifting (hereinafter BEPS) in order to address perceived flaws in 
international tax rules. BEPS contains 15 separate action points or work 
streams on different tax planning strategies that “exploit gaps and 
mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations 
where there is little or no economic activity, resulting in little or no overall 
corporate tax being paid”37. G20 countries also participated in the 
development of BEPS, while the EU has, already in March 2013, 
emphasized the importance of fiscal consolidation to ensure that everybody 
pays their share of taxes. It concluded that “(C)lose cooperation with the 
OECD and the G20 is needed to develop internationally agreed standards 
for the prevention of base erosion and profit shifting”.38 
Tax evasion has been an important topic in most of the G8 countries39 and it 
is unsurprising that, during the G8 meeting in June 2013, the UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron concluded that they “will focus on 3 Ts: Taxes, 
Transparency and Trade” (the transparency mentioned here functions to 
improve fairness in taxation). 
The OECD Report from 2014 (regarding Action Item 5 of the BEPS Action 
Plan) points out a different approach to preferential regimes, less ring-
fencing and more oriented to the reduction of the corporate tax base of some 
35 This requirement is concretely addressing Ed Miliband, the Labour leader who 
challenged Schmidt to say whether “Google would comply with the “spirit” of the tax laws, 
which might then lead to it being taxed more” (Wintour and Arthur 2013).  
36 UK 2012b, para 3. 
37 OECD 2013. 
38 EU 2013, para 6. 
39 As, for example, investigations on banking and offshore oasis (USA), football coaching 
star (Germany), fashion icons and former Prime Minister (Italy), football player (Spain, 
under pressure of G8) (Phillips Erb 2013). 
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multinational corporations which manipulate the base with particular types 
of income.40 
On 17 June 2015, the Commission adopted an Action plan for fair and 
efficient corporate taxation in the EU. Corporate taxation in the EU, 
according to the Commission, needs to be fundamentally reformed. 
Therefore, the Action Plan sets out to reform the corporate tax framework in 
the EU, in order to tackle tax abuse, to ensure sustainable revenues and to 
support a better Single Market by encouraging the business environment. 
The Commission identified five key action areas: (i) re-launching the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, CCCTB; (ii) ensuring fair 
taxation where profits are generated; (iii) creating a better business 
environment: (iv) increasing transparency; and (v) improving EU 
coordination. 
The recent EU Commission Work Programme 2016, with the suggestive 
title ‘No Time for Business as Usual’41 committed to focusing “on the big 
things where citizens expect Europe to make a difference”. Taxation, 
namely corporate taxation and fairness (“based on the principle that 
companies should pay taxes in the country where profits are generated”42), 
finds its place among several very important issues. The Corporate Tax 
Package consists of a set of measures to enhance the transparency of the 
corporate tax system and to fight tax avoidance, including the 
implementation of international standards on base erosion and profit 
shifting, and a staged approach starting with a mandatory tax base together 
with the withdrawal of the existing CCCTB proposal43.  
Simultaneously with the efforts of international and supranational 
organizations to fight against aggressive the tax planning of MNEs through 
guidelines, reports and action plans, formal investigations into EU fiscal 
state aid have been undertaken, explained infra in more detail. 
After the widespread awareness of the importance and unfairness of the tax 
evasion of (some) multinationals during the last decades, the question 
remains as to why governments have not acted sooner after the aggressive 
tax planning of the multinationals came to light? A reasonable explanation 
                                                 
40 OECD 2014. 
41 EU 2015. 
42 EU 2015c, para 8. 
43 EU 2015c. 
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is given by a “source close to Osborne”, the UK chancellor in 2013: 
“introducing the changes earlier may have scared the companies away from 
the UK and the nation could have lost them as big employers”. Now, 
however, the source has said “the tide of global political opinion has 
changed and the rest of the world agrees that tax avoidance must stop”44. If 
every government had been driven by the same fears, it is obvious that the 
outcome with regards to international taxation could not have been different. 
It seems that global tax issues need global actions to be solved at national 
levels. Unfortunately, global movements need more time, thus it took 
decades to reach this point of harmonization. Through the diligence and 
unity of the leading organizations and countries around the globe, we can 
expect to see a new global tax arena, accomplished with the new global 
economy. 
3.2. Transfer prices, rulings and advance pricing arrangements 
“Transfer prices are the prices at which an enterprise transfers physical 
goods and intangible property or provides services to associated 
enterprises”, and they are “significant for both taxpayers and tax 
administrations because they determine in large part the income and 
expenses, and therefore taxable profits, of associated enterprises in different 
tax jurisdictions”45. There are many types of inter-company transactions, 
which include transfers of tangible and intangible property, and the 
provision of services and finance, as well as rentals and leasing 
arrangements. The basis for determining proper compensation is the arm's 
length principle. This principle requires that compensation for any inter-
company transaction conform to the level that would have applied had the 
transaction taken place between unrelated parties, all other factors remaining 
the same. Even though the principle is simply stated, the actual 
determination of arm's length compensation is very complex.  
The OECE Guidelines study various pricing methodologies, with examples 
of their application, the first being “traditional transaction methods”. These 
are preferable methods as they are the most direct. However, under the 
44 Neate 2014. 
45 OECD 2010, 19. 
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Guidelines, a taxpayer must select the method that provides “the best 
estimation of an arm’s length price”. 
In addition to “traditional transaction methods” (the comparable 
uncontrolled price method, the resale price method and the cost-plus 
method), the OECD Guidelines describe “transactional profit methods” (the 
transactional net margin method and the transactional profit split method) 
that can be used to establish whether the conditions imposed between 
associated enterprises are consistent with the arm's length principle.46 
Another important issue regarding transfer pricing arrangements and EU 
investigations in the last two years are advance pricing arrangements 
(APAs) and tax rulings. 
“An APA is an arrangement that determines, in advance of a controlled 
transaction, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparable and 
appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for 
the determination of the transfer pricing for those transaction over a fixed 
period of time”47. APAs can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral (involving 
the taxpayer and one, two or more tax administrations). Administrative tax 
rulings are provided by many national tax authorities for reasons of legal 
certainty for taxpayers regarding specific transactions, for example in 
determining arm's length profits for transfer pricing transactions. In some 
countries advance rulings are published and some of them “have adopted 
circulars regulating the scope and extent of their ruling practices”48. 
The importance of administrative rulings in taxation and their relationship 
with state aid measures is highlighted in situations where, often in the 
absence of publication, they contain an interpretation of provisions which 
deviates from case law and administrative practice. The Commission 
indicates the importance of involved selectivity in tax rulings by bringing 
attention to particular circumstances: “(i) the tax authorities have discretion 
in granting administrative rulings; (ii) the rulings are not available to 
undertakings in a similar legal and factual situation; (iii) the administration 
appears to apply a more ‘favourable’ discretionary tax treatment compared 
with other taxpayers in a similar factual and legal situation; and (iv) the 
                                                 
46 OECD 2010, 59. 
47 OECD 2010, 23. 
48 EC 2014b, 44. 
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ruling has been issued in contradiction to the applicable tax provisions and 
has resulted in a lower amount of tax.”49. 
The aim of advance rulings should be to give taxpayers formal confirmation 
of related tax consequences in advance of entering into specific transactions. 
It should not result in the lower taxation of the taxpayer who obtains it, in 
comparison with taxpayers in a similar economic and legal situation who 
were not entitled to such rulings. The tax administrations of Member States 
should provide legal tax certainty and predictability but not selective state 
aids. 
3.3. Fiscal State Aid – Legal Basis 
In accordance with the EU policy of making the EU market equally 
competitive and fair for all companies, state aid rules (Articles 101-109 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, hereinafter TFEU) prescribe 
conditions for undertakings and rules on competition, while Articles 110 to 
113 of Chapter 2 (ex Articles 90 to 93 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, hereinafter TEC) separately lay down provisions on 
tax measures that may be regarded as fiscal state aid50,51. 
If the European Commission (Commission Directorates-General for 
Fisheries, Agriculture or Competition) has doubts about the compatibility of 
state law with the state aid provisions of the TFEU, for example, if a 
company receives government support as an advantage in any form on a 
selective basis, the Commission will open a formal investigation procedure. 
Where Member States prescribe general measures which do not address 
individual undertakings in a way that they do not depart from the general tax 
rules referring to all taxpayers in that country, the state aid provisions of the 
TFEU do not apply. On the contrary, if a tax measure is discriminatory, 
favouring specific enterprises or certain activities, it gives rise to 
proceedings for infringement under the rules of state aid prohibition. 
State aid measures are characterized by the following: (i) they involve an 
intervention by the state or through state resources; (ii) they give the 
49 EU 2014b, 45. 
50 Together with Chapter 3: Approximation of Laws - Articles 114 – 117 (ex Articles 95 – 
97 TEC) and Article 118, these articles make the Title VII of the TFEU – “Common rules 
on competition, taxation and approximation of laws”. 
51 EU 2002. 
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recipient an advantage on a selective basis; (iii) they cause or may cause a 
distortion of competition; and (iv) they affect trade between the Member 
States.52 
Tax provisions (Chapter 2, Title VII TFEU) prescribe tax measures in the 
form of state aid in the field of the turnover taxes, excise duties, repayments 
of exports and other forms of indirect taxation. Without prejudice to the 
reasons for the absence of similar provisions in the TFEU in the area of 
direct taxation, the Commission has made a considerable effort in tackling 
harmful tax competition and improving transparency in business taxation.53 
In 1998 the Commission issued a Notice on the application of state aid rules 
to measures relating to direct business taxation (98/C 384/03, hereinafter 
the Notice54) where it refers to the aids granted by states (today Article 107, 
paragraph 1 TFEU) of Chapter 1 (Rules on competition) which states that:  
“any aid granted by a Member State or through state 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade 
between Member States, be incompatible with the common 
market.” 
A tax measure constitutes aid if it meets the cumulative criteria: 
1. It gives an advantage through a reduction in the firm's tax 
burden in various ways (a reduction in the tax base, a total or 
partial reduction in the amount of tax or deferment, cancellation or 
special rescheduling of tax debt). 
2. The advantage is granted by the state or through state resources, 
including the forms of fiscal expenditures, granted also by 
regional or local bodies, through tax provisions of a legislative, 
regulatory or administrative nature, as well as through the 
practices of the tax authorities. 
                                                 
52 Art 107, para 1 TFEU. 
53 1 December 1997 may be considered a starting date, when the Council (ECOFIN) 
adopted the Code of Conduct for business taxation, after a wide-ranging discussion on the 
need for coordinated action at Community level to tackle harmful tax competition, 
including state aid (Articles 92 to 94 TEC). 
54 EU 1998. 
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3. The measure affects competition and trade between Member
States due to the exercise of an economic activity of the 
beneficiary (regardless of it's legal status or means of financing, or 
the fact that aid is relatively small in amount, or the fact that the 
recipient is moderate in size and regardless of the fact that the 
recipient does not carry exports inside the Community). 
4. The measure favours certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods, including selective advantages which derive from 
an exception to the tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or 
administrative nature or from a discretionary practice of the tax 
authorities55. 
Even though the Commission was initially supposed to review the 
application of the Notice two years after its publication (Paragraph 38), the 
Commission report on the implementation of the Commission notice on the 
application of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct business 
taxation (hereinafter the Report) was adopted by the Commission on 9 
February 200456. Due to the shortage of tax aid cases before 2001, the 
Commission had decided to issue the Report when it had sufficient 
experience in the actions taken in the field of tax aid. The aim of the Report 
was to accomplish an initial review of how the Notice has been applied.57 
After an extended but concise analysis of transfer pricing methods and many 
state-specific regimes of diverse tax measures, which constitute different 
fiscal state aids, the conclusions consist of three aspects: 
(i) the application of the Notice has allowed it's principles to be 
clarified while being a suitable tool for assessing tax aid; 
(ii) with regards to the relationship between state aid monitoring and 
actions to tackle harmful taxation, the Commission will continue to review 
tax aid, focusing on aid with significant economic impacts and particularly 
harmful effects on trade and competition; and 
55 In some cases, the nature or general scheme of the tax system may constitute the 
justification of the selective nature of a measure: the distinction between state aid and 
general measures are explained in more detail in paragraphs 13 – 16. See also EU 2012. 
56 EU 2004a. 
57 The purpose of the Notice was (i) not to constitute a new set of guidelines for assessing 
tax aid nor to signal any change in the Commission's approach to assessing the 
compatibility of such aid, but to (ii) clarify how Articles 87 and 88 TEC (new Articles 107 
and 108 TFEU) applied to tax measures (Report, para 3). 
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(iii) with regard to the question as to whether the principles set out in 
the Notice that concern only direct taxation can be applied to indirect tax 
measures, the Commission concluded that “the current Notice has provided 
a basis for the work in certain cases, in particular as regards the application 
of the principle whereby measures may be justified by the nature and general 
scheme of the system, but it does not cover all aspects of indirect 
taxation”.58 
 
3.4. EU Investigations 
After the Reuters release of a special report titled How Starbucks avoids UK 
Taxes on 15 October 2012, which compared legal filings in the UK with 
Starbucks' own group reports and transcripts of conference calls with 
investors and analysts over a 12 year period, and showed huge differences 
between Starbucks' performance as disclosed to the government and as 
marketed to the public,59 there was an immediate public and political 
reaction, including protests of activist organizations60 and testimonies before 
a Committee held in November 2012.61 
Even though some accusations failed to identify specific and concrete 
financial interests in Starbucks’ favour,62 the mere fact that the UK taxable 
base had been decreased formed a solid base for the further suspicion of the 
Committee and the public. Moreover, these transactions were also the 
subject of voluntary tax payments that Starbucks rendered in December 
2012 “above what is currently required by tax law”.63 
But these moves, conducted with the aim of minimizing the impact of the 
public outcry and recovering the trust of customers, have not impressed 
officials in the Commission. Following a statement a Starbucks executive 
                                                 
58 EU 2004a, para 75 – 80. 
59 The Committee found it “a bit odd” because the company were reporting losses in 
accounts submitted “to Companies House” and simultaneously “were promoting profits and 
promoting the individual responsible for the UK business”. Additionally, an inconsistency 
was found in the fact that Starbucks in UK “have run the business for 15 years”, with 
losses, but still are “carrying on investing here” (UK 2012c). 
60 Huet 2012. 
61 UK 2012b, para 7 and 8. 
62 For example, the loans that Starbucks UK received from the Starbucks headquarters in 
the USA, have not produced any tax savings at the consolidated level, due to the fact that 
the profits were moved to a country with a substantially higher tax rate (UK 2012c). 
63 Starbucks, 2012. 
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made to the Committee during the hearing, they “had a special tax 
arrangement with the Netherlands”, which they were asked to “hold in 
confidence”64, in July 2013 the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to 
provide information regarding tax ruling practices in the Netherlands and all 
rulings related to Starbucks’ Dutch subsidiaries.65 
The Commission opened an in-depth investigation into individual tax 
rulings and the tax regime in the Netherlands. Even though the Commission 
“does not expect to encounter systematic irregularities in tax rulings” in the 
Netherlands, it expressed concerns that the tax rulings for Starbucks 
Manufacturing EMEA BV (the Dutch subsidiary of Starbucks) “is providing 
that company with a selective advantage, because there are doubts about 
whether it is in line with a market-based assessment of transfer pricing”.66 
Based on a preliminary analysis of calculations used to determinate the 
taxable basis in this ruling, the Commission expressed concerns that they 
could decrease the taxable profits for Starbucks in the Netherlands, and thus 
could constitute state aid.67 
A preliminary analysis presents the transfer pricing regime in general and 
the transfer pricing arrangements Starbucks had agreed with the tax 
authorities in the Netherlands.68 It is a comprehensive report on all aspects 
of the legal and economic circumstances of the transactions between the 
Dutch subsidiaries and other related parties: financial reports, legal 
structures, APAs, benchmarking analysis, functional analysis and selection 
of transfer pricing methods; it consists of 132 recitals and a decision, in total 
40 pages. It thoroughly explains and concludes on the substance of the 
analysis, examining in a very detailed manner the transfer pricing methods 
agreed by the Dutch tax authorities. 
On 21 October 2015, the Commission issued a press release on the negative 
decisions with respect to the recovery from Starbucks and Fiat. The APAs 
concluded between these corporations and Member States constituted 
unlawful state aid69.70 Due to the artificial and complex methods endorsed in 
64 UK 2012c, para 8. 
65 EU 2014a. 
66 EU 2014. 
67 Ibidem. 
68 EU 2014c. 
69 EU 2015d. 
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the tax-rulings,71 taxable profits were established in a way that they did not 
reflect economic reality. The concrete results for the Starbucks' coffee 
roasting company were profits shifted abroad, with the tax burden being 
unduly reduced by EUR 20 to 30 million over the period under 
investigation. The Commission required the Netherlands to recover such 
state aid from Starbucks, and the company must cease to benefit from the 
advantageous tax position granted by this ruling. 
The Commission found that Starbucks used two ways to artificially lower 
taxes in the Netherlands, through Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV. This 
is a Starbucks manufacturing company based in the Netherlands as the only 
coffee roasting company in the Starbucks group in Europe which sells and 
distributes roasted coffee and coffee-related products (such as cups, pastries 
and packaged food) to Starbucks outlets in Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa. These two ways are:  
i. A substantial royalty paid for the use of know-how. It cannot be
justified, as it does not adequately reflect market value. Royalty
payments to affiliated company Alki in the UK72 for coffee-roasting
know-how was the only know-how payment because no other
Starbucks group company, or independent roasters to which roasting
is outsourced, are required to pay a royalty in essentially the same
situation. The existence and level of the royalty means that a large
part of its taxable profits was unduly shifted, as the Commission
found. Alki was neither liable to pay corporate tax in the UK, nor in
the Netherlands. These overestimated royalties, as accepted by the
70 At the time of the finalization of this article, the public version of decision was not yet 
available. As explained, it will be displayed as soon as it has been cleared of any 
confidential information. Therefore, with the aim of finding an adequate explanation of the 
arguments used by the Commission and the Netherlands, the EC Letter to the Netherlands 
is used in this article, even though later documentation and meetings were observed by the 
Commission (EC Letter, C(2014) 3626 final). 
71 It is emphasized again that tax rulings as such are “perfectly legal”. 
72 Interestingly enough, during the Committee hearing in the UK, Alki LP, the UK based 
company that receives the royalty payments, was not mentioned. Even though the fact that 
royalties are remitted back to the US was stressed few times, this tax transparent legal 
entity (limited partnership with partners in the Netherland and in the USA), if mentioned in 
due course at the hearing, might raise the question of UK competence over this 
remuneration route. 
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Dutch tax authorities, conferred a selective advantage on Starbucks 
Manufacturing BV. 
ii. An inflated price for green coffee beans to Switzerland-based
Starbucks Coffee Trading SARL, that unduly reduced Starbucks
Manufacturing tax base, leaving no margin to pay the above
mentioned royalties (since transfer prices for its
manufacturing/roasting services were set at very low level). This
caused other profits of the Starbucks Manufacturing BV to cover
royalty remunerations and decrease tax due in the Netherlands.
Both ways that Starbucks used, and the Dutch tax authorities approved, to 
artificially shift those profits where there was no economic justification, 
were analyzed by the Commission in detail in accordance with the OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines.  
As for the first point, in relation to the royalty payments to Alki LP, the 
most important concern for the Commission was the volatility of the royalty 
payments from year to year, which was not in line with sales (or profits). 
Moreover, the artificial character of the APA was recognized in situations 
where the royalty payments were negative, which would not be the case in 
transactions between independent economic operators. Finally, the complex 
and separate calculation of the royalty payments for know-how in the 
roasting process, which is more technical specification than intangible 
innovation, together with previous arguments, suggested that the level of 
those remunerations could have been overestimated.73 
The second way used to artificially decrease the tax base, payments for the 
raw materials at inflated prices, was in direct connection with: (i) the 
classification of Starbucks Manufacturing BV as a low-risk toll 
manufacturer; and (ii) two adjustments of the cost base for the application of 
the mark-up within the TNMM. 
A toll manufacturer (or contract manufacturer) usually processes raw 
materials or semi-finished products for another company and, as opposed to 
a fully-fledged manufacturer, does not bear the risk of inventories (or owns 
the inventory). Toll manufacturers offer expertise in performing certain 
manufacturing functions only and do not perform functions such as 
73 EU 2014c, sec. 3.1.3. 
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materials purchasing and production scheduling. Moreover, they usually do 
not face direct market risk because they have a guaranteed revenue stream 
from the customer with which they have concluded an agreement. 
Accordingly, their remuneration is on a fee basis (cost plus), or on a pre-
established price per unit. The intangibles of toll manufacturers are limited 
and typically consist of know-how related to the manufacturing processes. 
Due to all these characteristics, the rate of return received by toll 
manufacturers is generally significantly lower than the rate of return 
received by a fully-fledged manufacturer. The Commission expressed 
doubts regarding Starbucks Manufacturing BV being considered as a low-
risk toll manufacturer related to the fact that the inventories, though 
considered as being in consignment, appeared in the balance sheet and 
Starbucks Manufacturing BV records provisions for losses of inventory 
value. The relevant risks were not shifted from the Netherlands. An 
additional doubt with regards to the toll manufacturing arrangement was 
about the costs of raw materials (COGS) that were treated as pass-through 
costs, contrary to the OECD Guidelines, which indicates that full costs or 
operating expenses may be an appropriate base for a service or 
manufacturing activity and that they are often used in similar 
circumstances.74  
Using adjustments to decrease the tax base for the application of the mark-
up rate actually resulted in a lower mark-up and, moreover, using 
complicated and separate calculations for functions performed by Starbucks 
Manufacturing BV, excess remuneration was not attributed to it, but was 
transferred to Alki LP for the risk of taking title to raw material.75 Another 
doubt about the appropriateness of the adjustments referred to the similarity 
of both adjustments, so the Commission concluded that they addressed the 
same comparability concern and, therefore, “one of those adjustments seems 
redundant”76. Other important suspicions the Commission expressed were: 
(i) the assumption from the transfer pricing study that EURIBOR is a risk-
                                                 
74 OECD 2010, para 2.87 and 2.93. 
75 In spite of the fact that it was not documented in the file. Furthermore, this structure 
provides that a function allegedly performed in Switzerland would be remunerated in the 
UK, where Alki LP is established. It means that income will be taxed in the countries of the 
tax residences of its partners.  
76 EU 2014c, para 98. 
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free rate77 so further spread was added to it (50 basis points without 
explanation); (ii) adjustment of the costs relating to the employees of 
Starbucks’ Swiss subsidiary performing the sourcing activities, even though 
these costs were not part of the operating costs of Starbucks Manufacturing 
BV; and (iii) adjustment for the working capital which was not made based 
on working capital figures.78 
Therefore, the Commission considered that Starbucks Manufacturing BV 
did not comply with the arm’s length principle and it obtained an advantage 
from the Dutch authorities since these measures appeared to constitute a 
reduction of remuneration that normally should be borne by independent 
parties.  
4. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENSES FOR THE CROATIAN TAX
ADMINISTRATION 
The financial goals of multinational enterprises are important issues that 
shape transfer pricing policies. Managing cash flows, funding capital 
expansion, paying interest on debt, encouraging research and development, 
supporting stock option plans and funding dividend payments to 
shareholders, require placing income in the legal entity where the funds are 
required. If this allocation of income is based on overriding business reasons 
for wanting to place functions, risks and assets (mainly intangible) in certain 
locations due strictly to tax motives and ignoring economic reality, the 
transfer prices resulting from such circumstances will not be accepted by tax 
authorities. The gap between substantial profits on a corporate level 
(consolidated accounts shown to investors and analysts), and tax losses 
reported to the tax authorities, can be a result of tax planning techniques that 
are inspired by governments. However, the same difference may be a result 
of taxpayers’ tax planning that is not accomplished in accordance with the 
spirit of the tax legislation. If, for example, a taxpayer decreases its tax base 
77 Euro Interbank Offered Rate. The Euribor rates are based on the average interest rates at 
which a large panel of European banks borrow funds from one another, so it includes the 
applicable risk premium (Euribor-rates.eu). 
78 Ibidem. 
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due to investments in research and development, or the training of 
employees, it is often recognised by tax authorities as a desirable tax cut. 
But, if a taxpayer reports consolidated profits with little or no tax paid in a 
certain country owing to complicated and artificial tax planning schemes, 
then it will be considered as tax avoidance inconsistent with the intent of the 
law. 
However, there is a fine line between the two that legislators and 
international leaders have to regulate in order to improve fairness and 
certainty in the global tax arena. Due to the complexity of the economic 
substance of the transactions and the dynamic global environment, 
legislators need time to clarify the issues. 
Until tax administrations clarify the criteria and take another critical step 
towards safeguarding legal tax certainty, a general estimation of the tax risks 
for multinationals can be pointed out: those who have relied strictly on the 
letter of law using the principle “if they know it is too good to be true, they 
should be worried”79. More worries for corporate managers may arise from 
the words of Commissioner Moscovici, who said that the tax affairs of an 
additional 300 multinationals could potentially come under the 
Commission's scrutiny80. 
Unfortunately, additional tax risks are likely to be raised due to the impact 
of these investigations on the tax administrations of Member States. 
Following the announcements of the verdicts of Competition Commissioner 
M. Vestager on Starbucks and Fiat Finance and Trade, and welcoming the 
Commission's decisions, M. Ferber stressed that “the Member States who 
granted them also need to be punished”, while M. Theurer pointed out that 
this verdict was not only issued “against Starbucks and Fiat, but also against 
Member States”81. Commissioner Margrethe Vestager herself said “I hope 
that, with today's decisions, this message will be heard by Member State 
governments and companies alike.”82 These strong words, coming from the 
the key TAXE MEPs, and Commissioner, might sound threatening for the 
tax administrations and governments of Member States. 
79 Concretely, Heather Self, a tax partner at the law firm Pinsent Masons said: “Anyone 
who has got a ruling they know is too good to be true should be worried.”(Garside, 2014). 
80 Kavanagh and Robins 2015, 370. 
81 EU TAXE Press release, 2015. 
82 EC Press release IP-15-5880. 
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In this way HMRC, for example, was blamed by the Parliamentary 
Committee for not pursuing all the tax due from big businesses, towards 
which it was too lenient83. The Dutch tax administration was also 
forewarned in the Commissions Letter84 that tax authorities are responsible 
for the comparison of the method proposed by the taxpayer with “the 
prudent behaviour of a hypothetical market operator, which would require a 
market to confirm remuneration of a subsidiary or a branch, which reflects 
normal conditions of competition”.  
Maybe this might be an easy task for a modern European tax administration, 
such as the Dutch one, due to the fact that, in addition to its tradition and 
modernity, they operate at typical western European market standards and 
functions almost perfectly, with all the players being perfectly informed and 
acting as a simple homo oeconomicus.85 However, bearing in mind the 
economic crisis in Croatia, and thousands of employers struggling to survive 
in the market, with thousands of employees not getting a salary for their 
work86, together with a tax administration that has to grow from the “old” to 
a new, modern and sophisticated administration, one which serves 
taxpayers, in an uncertain environment of constantly changing tax 
legislation and the implementation of new legal tax instruments, it is 
reasonable to be sceptical. Croatia does not have strong, successful 
multinational companies established within the country, and suffers from 
low inward foreign direct investment, as well as from an important presence 
of foreign based multinational enterprises. Even the simple export of goods 
and services is considered as a success for Croatian entrepreneurs. Legal 
uncertainty and labour costs are very high, while the market is very small. 
All these factors combined together mean that market conditions and 
prerequisites for Croatian companies during negotiations on business deals 
with its counterparts can differ, with margins extremely volatile, largely 
dependable on weak negotiation positions and a strong willingness to 
compromise. 
83 UK 2012b, para 3. 
84 EU 2014c, para 77. 
85 Which can hardly be true, due to the complexity of human behavior and even more 
complex market imperfections and rapid changes. 
86 See: List of the taxpayers/employers that, according to available information, do not give 
salaries to their employees (CTA 2015). 
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The CTA might be confused by such scrutiny from the EU Commission: on 
the one hand required to be a partner with taxpayers, and supportive to 
foreign investors and business, and on the other, instructed by supranational 
bodies to establish “the prudent behaviour” of entrepreneurs.87 At the time 
when Croatian tax officers receive the first enquiries for binding rulings and 
answer them to their best of their knowledge, putting great efforts into 
understanding the business positions of the entrepreneurs who seek greater 
legal tax certainty, the development of such a supranational tax system 
within the EU might result in turning the administration’s approach back to 
traditional scrutiny. 
If tax administration officers are to understand EU instructions so as to act 
in a manner that strictly applies the best margin available, according to the 
evidence, on transactions within their country for each and every case, then 
businesses would depend on the tax bureaucracy's subjective interpretation 
of the tax bureaucracy relating to the market conditions which determine 
market prices, always with best case scenarios for the budget and worst case 
scenarios for taxpayers.88 
In such a scenario it would be less harmful to establish “tax transfer prices” 
for all entrepreneurs in advance.89 Consequently, every company should 
know what is acceptable as a revenue or a cost for tax purposes. 
Paradoxically enough, in some cases the result of these ”prescribed transfer 
prices” might be a profit. It sounds like a very unpopular measure of a 
‘command economy’, but it seems that it might be favourable for 
entrepreneurs to have clear guidelines of prices with affiliated companies 
87 Interestingly enough, some projects of the CTA were realised in cooperation with experts 
from the Tax and Customs Administration of the Netherlands (see: CTA 2011; CTA 2010). 
88 Every transaction with an affiliated company can be accomplished in both directions – a 
domestic company might be in a position to buy or sell from/to a foreign company. If 
buying and selling transactions are interpreted differently, depending on the consequences 
for the state budget, then it is better to have the same prices stipulated in advance, no matter 
the market conditions, but in favor of legal tax certainty and possible positive consequences 
for profitability. In other words, if every transaction is recognized by tax officials, with the 
fear of being accused of ‘lenient treatment’ and ‘selective advantage’ for a taxpayer, in 
accordance with the comparable data available only to the tax administration, at a price that 
the less it increases the budget income the more it increases taxable profit and tax payable.  
89 Within the scope of the arm's length principle for transfer prices it would mean, for 
example, determining margins and a basis for the application of these margins. 
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which they know in advance90. Under such conditions, entrepreneurs would 
have ‘a clear picture’ of future tax liability and a better chance to choose 
profitable transactions. Nonetheless, this would be contrary to the principles 
of taxation91 and as such has a very low probability of realization. 
Therefore, what can be expected consequent to the EU investigations into 
the CTA? How will it affect the issuance of binding opinions or the attitude 
towards big business, mainly multinational companies, in Croatia? First, 
binding opinions that could be issued by the CTA have a very narrowly 
defined scope of subjects, as explained supra, where an APA is not an 
option so it is not possible to sign advance agreements on transfer pricing.92 
As the CTA had always been reluctant to prescribe APAs, bearing in mind 
recent EU investigations, it is hard to believe that such tax arrangements 
would be allowed in the near future. Moreover, if we imagine how 
negatively the Commission’s investigations and warnings may influence the 
CTA, then this might be hypothetically visible as a change during tax audits, 
where tax inspectors might change (or pursue) their behaviour with the 
simple aim of using the best case scenario for the Croatian budget as the 
only “economic substance”, with benchmarking analysis in accordance with 
the transactions from the market that best fit. Conducting an audit in such a 
manner will be accepted from the public as well as from the EU 
Commission. However, it is also possible that the CTA, after years of 
training and practice, will act confidently, recognising instructions from the 
EU as guidelines and assistance in better understanding transfer pricing 
issues, at the same time as supporting business with legal tax certainty.  
Without any prejudice against the tax avoidance of multinationals and 
against European tax administrations, the mere fact that well-known tax 
90 The market prices in such cases are not the same as prices that would be recognized for 
taxation purposes, but this information would be crucial for taxpayers to calculate the 
taxable profit and plan their activities in advance. 
91 As pointed out in the analysis of Starbucks' transfer prices (but not in the same context): 
“If the same logic is followed, the business of the company could be considered as low-risk 
because there would be no variation of the tax liability between fiscal years. However, such 
a lump sum payment could hardly be reconciled with the underlying economic reality of the 
transactions and the risks of the business activity and could not be reconciled with the 
principles of taxation. “(EU EC Letter, 2014, recital 88). 
92 As explained in the letter of Mr. Lalovac (Croatian Minister of Finance) to TAXE 
Special Committee (MF, 2015). 
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administrations within the EU have been warned about the distortions of 
competition through selective tax advantages given to some enterprises, 
raises the question as to the possible consequences for tax administrations in 
developing countries and decreases tax safety for entrepreneurs. Partnership 
and cooperation between the tax administration and taxpayers in Croatia are 
at the rudimentary stage, so this fragile phase can be easily threatened by 
potential accusations from European authorities. 
5. CONCLUSION
The basic principles of an actual international tax regime were laid out at the 
first Model convention issued by the League of Nations, based on the report 
of four economists in March 192393. This, almost 100 year-old, concept of 
taxation needs to be modernised. The OECD, the G20 and the EU have 
taken the initiative, and it seems that nothing can stop the process of the 
implementation of fairness in taxation in the globalized arena, not even the 
threats of the scrutiny of tax administrations which could slow down 
economic recovery. 
While transfer pricing represents the most complex and fluid issue in tax 
practice, when combined with intellectual property, and hybrid mismatch 
arrangements together with considerable amounts of international trade 
employed, it goes without saying that a number of actions were undertaken 
to combat the aggressive tax planning of multinationals. The EU has found a 
new modus operandi to deny benefits in the case of harmful transfer pricing 
arrangements with the tax administrations of Member States, namely 
compatibility with state aid rules. 
Traditionally ‘tax friendly’ countries, which have a well-developed and 
consistent practice providing security to tax payers, have been warned by 
these actions of the OECD and the EU about certain behaviour which is no 
longer considered acceptable. The ability of these countries (as well as 
MNEs) to adapt to new circumstances is undoubtable. 
Nonetheless, there is a question as to how, with such turnarounds in tax 
policy, the EU states still in development will manage. One can assume that 
the tax authorities of countries in transition, which are trying to catch up 
93 Bogovac 2014, 111. 
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with modern administrations, would find themselves in a difficult situation 
adjusting the process of ‘partnership with taxpayers’ to the new direction of 
fighting against tax evasion. The CTA has made great efforts in developing 
better relations with taxpayers, while introducing instruments that reduce 
tax risk. Now that it is these instruments to increase legal tax safety (such as 
binding opinions) which have become the subject of the scrutiny of the EU, 
the focus has shifted to instruments which prevent tax evasion, to the 
detriment of ‘partnership’ and the legal certainty of taxpayers. 
The very complex system of unreliable allowances and the incompatibility 
of tax systems makes it extremely difficult for businesses to take long-term 
investment decisions, while decisions they have already made for 
undertakings that are now part of their everyday business life are under the 
unexpected scrutiny of the OECD and EU officials. 
The ratio of trust between tax administrations and taxpayers is one of the 
important ratios in the increase of tax avoidance. In such a manner as to 
identify it, Jelčić finds that, in Croatia, the tax administration and its attitude 
towards taxpayers are unprofessional, unconscionable and non-objective, as 
well as inefficient and arrogant94. Following the path of tax avoidance, 
whether conducted with or without the intention of taxpayers, the tax 
administration increases the number of investigations and treats all 
taxpayers with more scrutiny, creating a vicious circle of constant 
antagonism between taxpayers and tax authorities95. Since the EU fiscal 
state aid investigations put pressure on both subjects of the tax system (the 
taxpayers as well as tax administrations) they constitute an additional 
accelerant in this vicious circle of taxation. This may give rise to a 
lengthened period of uncertainty for business and tax authorities, especially 
in developing countries, due to their struggles in identifying what constitutes 
‘economic reality’ or ‘market conditions’ in accordance with newly 
established supranational standards.The categories and values ascribable to 
the rule of law, such as predictability and legal certainty in the tax field, are 
now at very low levels, as a new era begins of taxation regarding big 
business. 
94 Jelčić et al. 2008, 216. 
95 Bogovac 2015, 268-269. 
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While the Croatian economy shows some signs of recovery,96 we can only 
hope that the hard-earned profits of entrepreneurs will not be lost in tax 
disputes with the CTA. 
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Sažetak __________________________________________________________________ 
ISTRAGE O NEZAKONITIM DRŽAVNIM POTPORAMA U OPOREZIVANJU I 
MOGUĆI UTJECAJ NA HRVATSKU POREZNU UPRAVU 
U članku su prikazane nedavno pokrenute istrage EU-a o transfernim cijenama kod 
oporezivanja dobiti nekih multinacionalnih korporacija. Ove istrage ispituju jesu li odluke 
poreznih uprava Irske, Nizozemske i Luksemburga (u vezi s Appleom, Starbucksom i Fiat 
Finance and Tradeom) sukladne EU-pravilima o državnim potporama. Potaknute 
naporima OECD-a i porasta javne kritike na nepoštenu alokaciju poreznog tereta između 
multinacionalnih korporacija i manjih, tuzemnih poduzeća i stanovništva, Europska je 
komisija u posljednje dvije godine poduzela mjere s ciljem uvođenja više pravednosti u 
oporezivanje porezom na dobit u Europi. Ovaj članak proučava utjecaj trenutnih 
međunarodnih napora u ponovnom uređivanju globalnog poreznog sustava, na hrvatsku 
Poreznu upravu, koja nastoji držati korak u harmonizaciji s Europskim poreznim pravom, 
praksom i partnerskim odnosom s poreznim obveznicima. 
Ključne riječi: fiskalna potpora; EU istrage; Porezna uprava Republike Hrvatske. 
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